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THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
DISCLAIMER CLAUSES IN SALE OF
GOODS TRANSACTIONS IN CANADA*
By PETER A. CUMMING*
INTRODUCTION
This article provides an analysis of the treatment of disclaimer clauses
by the courts in Canada in respect to sale of goods transactions. The term
"disclaimer clause" is used throughout to describe the type of clause employed
in a contract to cut down or to exclude obligations otherwise arising on the
part of one of the parties to the sale transaction, or to modify or exclude the
remedies which are otherwise available to the innocent party upon the breach
of an obligation by the other party. In the case of the consumer sale, the
clause is invariably for the advantage of the seller or manufacturer. Such
clauses are often referred to as "exemption", "exclusion", "exception", "ex-
culpatory" or "limited liability" clauses. However, the term "disclaimer
clause" is commonly employed to embrace all of the possible variations of
clauses of the type under consideration. The same principles of law are
applicable in respect to all the variations of the "disclaimer clause", although
when the clause under consideration simply modifies or limits the remedies
otherwise available to the innocent party there is perhaps a greater chance
that it will be asserted successfully by the party seeking to rely upon it.
*The writer acknowledges with appreciation the assistance received through re-
search done for the writer by Ronald Dash and James Hodgson, graduates of Osgoode
Hall Law School of York University. This article was originally prepared as a back-
ground working paper to a larger research undertaking by an Osgoode Hall Law School
of York University group, including Professor Jacob S. Ziegel and William A. W.
Nielson, and the writer.
**Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
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Although disclaimer clauses are found in virtually all types of contractual
transactions, discussion will be limited mainly to a consideration of disclaimer
clauses in sale of goods transactions. However, the same principles of law
are applicable to disclaimer clauses in all types of contractual transactions.
The judicial approach in Canada has been constrained by the continuing
myth of freedom of contract and the principle that contractual obligations are
of a voluntary nature because disclaimer clauses have been dealt with within
the framework of the common law of contract, apart from those instances of
statutory regulation.' The language of the decisions is cloaked in acceptable
traditional principles of construction of the terms of the contract. The court
construes the supposed intentions of the parties in respect to the voluntary
obligations presumably assumed under the contract.
Although the courts have shown creativity in coping with the pheno-
menon of the disclaimer clause, the limitations of the traditional private law
context for regulation thereof have often led to tortuous reasoning in judg-
ments, uncertainty in the event of breakdown of contract, and unpredicta-
bility in the planning of contractual obligations. The discussion has taken
place for the most part at a level of abstract reasoning incomprehensible to
most lawyers, and undoubtedly to all consumers. The aversion of the courts
to disclaimer clauses has lead to commendable results in most instances,
because the courts are inclined to follow their impulses as to fairness. How-
ever, the means employed to arrive at a just result usually leaves a great deal
to be desired.
With the standard form contract and the inequality of bargaining power
on the part of the consumer in the market place, the consumer is either un-
aware of the disclaimer clause or, if aware, does not appreciate the legal
consequences. Even if he is aware and fully understands the legal effect of the
disclaimer clause, often his only real choice, for example, as with the pur-
chase of a new car, is to purchase the item on the terms offered by the seller,
or to do without. There is little opportunity to negotiate in respect to the
"boiler-plate" provisions. The consumer needs protection from the literal
contract and needs to be afforded the appropriate remedies, through a con-
venient and inexpensive medium, for the enforcement of his substantive ex-
pectations under his contract.
The results achieved through the courts have for the most part been
satisfactory, and the results are consistent with traditional contract law
I The Conditional Sales Act, R.S.S. 1965, c. 393, s. 25 (1); see Johnson v. Relland
Motors, [1955] 2 D.L.R. 418 (Sask. C.A.); The Consumer Protection Act, R.S.M.
1970, c.200, s.96; The Farm Implement Act, S.P.E.I. 1968, c.49, s.10; The Farm
Implement Act, S.A. 1967, c.20, s.9(1); see Nolan v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement
Company (1920), 15 Alta. LR. 353 (Alta. App. Div.), [1921] 2 W.W.R. 416 (S.C.C.);
The Farm Machinery and Equipment Act, S.M. 1971, c. 83 (assented to July 27,
1971), ss. 11, 13, 14; see Allard v. Robert (1959), 28 W.W.R. 303 (Man. Q.B.); The
Agricultural Implements Act, 1968, S.S. 1968, c.1, s.16(1); see Western Tractor and
Equipment Co. Ltd. v. Lashby, [1954] 1 D.LR. 714 (Sask. CA.); Chursenoff et al. v.
Bailey Bros., [1924] 2 D.L.R., 1105 (Sask. CA.); Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v.
Zomar, [1929] 4 D.LR. 65 (Sask. CA.); Sale of Goods Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c.344,
s.21(A), as am. by S.B.C. 1971, c.52, s.1; The Consumer Protection Act, 1966, R.S.O.
1970, c.82, s.44, as am. by S.O. 1971, c.24, s.2; [Quebec] Consumer Protection Act,
S.Q. 1971, c.74, s.118, proclaimed in force July 21, 1971.
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principles. The innocent party is provided with the remedy of damages so
as to put him in the position as though the contract has been perfomed, 2 or
alternatively, there is a discharge of his obligations under the contract and
he is put in the position he was in before the contract was made.3
Although the impulse of the court is to consider what the expectation
of the consumer was, and to provide a remedy to fulfill the expectation in
the event of the seller's default, the courts are reluctant to simply speak in
such direct language. The courts have dealt with the problem through tradi-
tional rules of construction as to contractual intention, or by acceptable labels
(for example, "fundamental breach") rather than through language which
speaks directly to the actual issues.
First to be discussed will be the principles employed to decide whether
and when a disclaimer clause is in fact a term of the contract. The three
basic approaches of the courts in dealing with the disclaimer clause deter-
mined to be a term of the contract, will then be discussed. Finally, considera-
tion will be given to the judicial treatment of disclaimer clauses on the basis
of such clauses being contrary to a substantive rule of common law. The
legislative reaction to disclaimer clauses will be left for a subsequent article.
There is a discernible pattern to the historical development of the treat-
ment of disclaimer clauses by the courts. In the earlier years of this century
the courts employed the traditional rules of construction to construe the
meaning of the wording of the disclaimer clause by considering it within the
context of the language of simply the disclaimer clause itself. Later, the courts
more frequently used and relied upon the traditional rules of construction to
determine the meaning of the language of the disclaimer clause by construing
that language within the context of the language of the agreement as a whole.
More recently, the courts have adopted the modern doctrine of "fundamental
breach" or "breach of a fundamental term". Therefore, it is convenient to
separate the case law into these three, albeit interrelated and overlapping,
approaches. It should be noted in this regard that the Canadian courts have
relied heavily upon the British common law development in respect to all
approaches employed in dealing with disclaimer clauses.
THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF DISCLAIMER CLAUSES ON
THE BASIS OF THE TRADITIONAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
A. Construction as to the Terms of the Contract
As a matter of first principles of contract law, the factual situation must
be construed to determine whether the asserted disclaimer clause is in fact
a term in the contract before proceeding to the further question whether, as
a matter of construction, the clause effectively prevents or limits liability.
Contracts are voluntary obligations, and a party should not be held to
have assented to a term of the contract unless he should reasonably have
2 E.g. Sally Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Company, [1911] A.C. 301 (P.C.)
(Que.).
3 E.g. McLachlan v. Homer, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 188 (Ont CA.).
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thought the contract included such term, and similarly, the other party
therefore reasonably thought, and presumably relied upon the assumption,
that the terms of the contract were on the given basis. The common law
requirement is that a term is only incorporated in the contract by signature
or if reasonable notice of its existence has been given to the party adversely
affected by it at, or before, the time of the making of the contract.5 In par-
ticular, disclaimer clauses in carriage and bailment contracts have often been
held to be inoperative for failing to meet this test because the contract often
consists of more than one document, or is partly oral and partly written.6 The
approach has also been used by Canadian courts in respect to sale of goods
transactions.
In Canada Building Materials Ltd. v. W. R. Meadows of Canada Ltd.
7
the disclaimer clause was held not to exclude the implied condition of section
15. 1. of The Sale of Goods Act, as the disclaimer clause was "contained in
general sales literature which remains unread".8 Similarly, in Fillmore's Valley
Nurseries Ltd. v. North American Cyanamid Ltd.9 the court held that the
implied condition of being fit for a particular purpose was not excluded as the
asserted disclaimer clause was contained in an "[a]cknowledgement of order
form' 0 received by the purchaser after receipt of the chemical purchased, and
an invoice containing the disclaimer clause was received even later." A dis-
claimer clause contained within the printing on the labels of the cans contain-
ing the chemical purchased was also held to not be part of the contract.' 2
In the sale of goods transaction the disclaimer clause is, of course,
usually contained within the actual sales document(s)' 1 which is asserted to be
the contract. Moreover, the purchaser often puts his signature to the contract
document(s).
If the document provides reasonable notice of the disclaimer clause, or
the purchaser signs the document below the wording containing the disclaimer
clause, it is thereby incorporated as a term of the contract, it being irrele-
vant whether it was read, or understood, by the purchaser.' 4 In other words,
there is a duty upon the purchaser to read and understand, and if he fails to
4A person who signs a document constituting a contract is bound by the terms
thereof even though he has not read them. L'Estrange v. Graucob, [1934] All E.R.
16, 18, 19, [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (CA.); Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. Lester, [1927]
4 D.L.R. 51 (Ont. C.A.); but see McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd., [1964]
1 W.L.R. 125, 133 (H.L.).
5 Parker v. S.E. Ry (1877), 2 C.P.D. 416; Olley v. Marlborough Court, [1949]
1 K.B. 532.
GDebush v. Greater Winnipeg Water Dist., [1946] 2 W.W.R. 353 (Man. C.A.);
Spooner v. Starkman, [1937] O.R. 542 (Ont. CA.).
7 (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 674 (Ont. H.C.).
8 Id., at 680.
0 (1958), 14 D.L.R. (2d) 297 (N.S.S.C.).
10 Id., at 306.
1 lId., at 306, 307.
121d., at 307, 321.
Is Note however that the contract may consist of a number of sales documents.
14 Supra, note 4.
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do so it is at his peril.15 The purchaser is bound if he knows the general
nature of the document, that is, simply that it pertains to the sale.10
Although this traditional approach of the law is based upon a policy of
giving greater certainty to contractual expectations (that is, both parties can,
or should reasonably expect, each other to be bound by the written terms), 1
in the modem era of the standard form contract it is a fiction to suggest that
the consumer has read the contract and, even if it has been read, that he has
understood the meaning of the disclaimer clause.
The traditional approach, in the absence of further, modifying, prin-
ciples, therefore tends somewhat paradoxically to subvert the true substantive
expectations of the purchaser (and such expectations are known, or should
be known, to the seller) which may well not accord with the asserted terms
of the written document(s).
Even if the purchaser acted because of misrepresentations by the seller
or his salesman, the purchaser may well still be unsuccessful. Unless the
misrepresentation was fraudulent,' 8 the consumer may be met with two prob-
lems. First, the parol evidence rule prevents a purchaser from adding to,
varying, or contradicting the written terms of the document(s), 19 unless the
purchaser can establish that he falls within an exception to the rule.
20
15 See generally Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read - Business
Run by LB.M. Machines, The Law of Contracts and Credits Cards (1965-66), 19 Vand.
L. Rev. 1051.
16 The purchaser can assert a non est factum defence when there is a mistake as
to the nature of the entire document, although this is, of course, only very rarely the
situation. L'Estrange v. Graucob, [1934] All E.R. 16, 18, 19, [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (CA.).
17 See, for example, Case Threshing Machine Co. v. Mitten (1919), 49 D.L.R. 30,
31 (Sask.) (S.C.C.).
IS E.g. Ballard v. Gaskill (1955), 14 W.W.R. (N.S.) 519 (B.C.C.A.). Fleischhaker
v. Fort Garry Agencies Ltd. (1958), 11 D.L.R. (2d) 599, at 602, (Man. C.A.); Jacobs
v. Batavia & General Plantations Trust Ltd., [1924] 1 Ch. 287, at 295; Alabastine Co.
of Paris Ltd. v. Canada Producer & Gas Co. Ltd. (1914), 30 O.L.R. 394, at 400
(Ont. CA.); Eisler v. Canadian Fairbanks Co. (1912), 8 D.L.R. 390, at 394 (Sask.
S.C.).
' 9 E.g. Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. Lester, [1927] 4 D.LR. 51 (Ont. CA.);
Gratton v. Forrest City Motors, [1954] O.W.N. 167; R. W. Heron Paving Ltd. v.
Dilworth Equipment Ltd. (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 462 (Ont. H.C.) decided in favour
of the purchaser on another point. See R. Cross, Evidence (3rd ed., London: Butter-
worth and Co., 1967), at 508-517.
20 A party may be able to establish that he falls within one of the exceptions to
the parol evidence rule. E.g. Wiebe v. Butchart's Motors Ltd., [1949] 2 W.W.R. 688
(B.C.CA.); Long v. Smith (1911), 23 O.L.R. 121, at 127, 128 (Ont. CA.); Beck
v. Brody, [1943] 1 W.W.R. 360 (Alta. S.C.); McLachlan v. Homer, [1937] 4 D.LR.
188 (Ont. C.A.) (that there is a collateral oral contract to the written contract);
Ferland v. Keith, [1958] O.W.N. 445, 446 (CA.); Francis v. Trans-Canada Sales Ltd.
(1969), 69 W.W.R. 748 (Sask. C.A.). The court is given a great deal of discretion
in these situations, and it is impossible to predict the outcome of a case, because there
is never any ostensible intention by the parties to enter into a collateral contract. If
the court's impulse is to find for the purchaser, a collateral contract may be easily
established. However, if the court's impulse is to find for the seller the court can just
as easily invoke the parol evidence rule.
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Secondly, there is often a disclaimer provision which asserts that the
written document(s) constitutes the "entire agreement". 2 ' There is often, as
well, a further disclaimer provision which states that the salesman has no
authority to make representations, or terms of the contract, on behalf of the
seller.22 Thus, although the consumer is often solely or primarily induced by,
and relies upon, oral representations made by a salesman of the seller, his
expectations may be frustrated by such provisions which he has neither read
nor understood, nor would imagine to be contained in the written document(s).
If evidence is held to be admissible in respect to the oral representa-
tions, the consumer is met with a further problem in respect to available
remedies. If the representations are held to not be a term of the contract,
then the only remedy is rescission, and there is uncertainty as to when this
will be given in the event that the contract has been executed, as will, of
course, usually be the situation.2
3
B. The Judicial Treatment of Disclaimer Clauses Through the Use of the
Traditional Rules of Construction as to the Meaning of the Language of the
Contract
The rules or cannons of construction employed to interpret the meaning
of the words within a contract, and the resulting legal effect of such contract,
have afforded the courts some flexibility in dealing with the disclaimer clauses.
The wording of the disclaimer clause is considered within both (1) the con-
text of the wording of the disclaimer clause itself and also (2) the context of
the general wording of the entire document(s) constituting the contract.
In the absence of any language suggesting the contrary, the implied
conditions and warranties of the Sale of Goods Act will, of course, be terms
of the contract by operation of law. Similarly, in the absence of any language
21See, for example, the disclaimer clauses in F & B Transport Ltd. v. White Truck
Sales Manitoba Ltd. (1965), 51 W.W.R. 124, at 126 (Man. CA.); and Canadian
Acceptance Corp. Ltd. v. Mid-Town Motors Ltd. (1970), 72 W.W.R. 365 (Sask. D.C.).
In both of these cases the courts did not give effect to such a clause.
22 See, for example, the disclaimer clause in R. W. Heron Paving Ltd. v. Dilworth
Equipment Ltd. (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 462, at 470, 473 (Ont. H.C.) where such a
provision was held to be operative to exclude representations made prior to the contract,
although the purchaser was successful in its action on other grounds; see also Canadian
Gas Power and Launches Limited v. Orr Brothers Limited (1911), 23 O.L.R. 616
(Ont. C.A.).
23 Doubt has been expressed that the remedy of rescission for innocent misrepre-
sentation applies at all to a contract for the sale of goods. Atiyah, Rescission of a
Contract of Sale of Goods (1959), 22 M.L.R. 76. But see P. Atiyah, Sale of Goods
(3rd ed., Pitman and Sons, London: 1966) at 225. However, there is authority sup-
porting the view that a contract for the sale of goods can be rescinded for an innocent
misrepresentation, Leaf v. International Galleries, [1950] 2 K.B. 86 (CA.). However,
there is confusion as to the extent to which the remedy is available upon execution of
the contract. The law has, of course, changed somewhat in England with the passage
of the Misrepresentation Act, 1967, c.7, s.3(U.K.). For a discussion of the problems in
this regard in Canada, see O'Flaherty v. McKinlay (1952), 30 M.P.R. 172, at 181-183
(Nfld. C.A.) where the court had to employ imaginative reasoning to allow rescission
of a contract in respect to a used car represented to be "new" which the consumer had
driven 7,000 miles before learning of the misrepresentation.
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suggesting the contrary, the obligations assumed under the contract will not
be modified nor will the normal remedies for non-fulfilment of those obliga-
tions be modified or excluded. The rules of construction (within the context
of the disclaimer clause problem), therefore, only need receive consideration
when there is language (i.e. a disclaimer clause) which suggests a derogation
in respect to obligations otherwise presumed to be present under the contract.
The rule of construction most often referred to in this regard is that of
contra proferentem, that is, if there is any ambiguity in the language of the
document(s), with resulting doubt, the language will be construed least
favourably to the party who is relying upon it.24 Often the court simply
applies the rule as one of strict construction and restrictive interpretation of
the disclaimer clause, without reference to any issue of ambiguity. Therefore,
the disclaimer clause will be ineffective unless express, clear words are
employed to negative or modify obligations, the presumption in interpreta-
tion of the language of the contract being against the operation of the dis-
claimer clause. This presumption is supported by the fact that the Sale of
Goods Act provides that all of the provisions of the statute apply, including
the implied conditions and warranties, unless "negatived or varied by express
agreement" 25 and further that:
[aln express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition im-
plied by this Act unless inconsistent therewith.28
However, the presumption against the operation of the disclaimer clause
has often been stretched by the court in favour of the purchaser because the
court considers the merits of the particular case to be with the purchaser, and
the only framework for regulation of the disclaimer clause rests within the
traditional rules of construction. Thus, the decisions of the courts have led
to what can almost be called a game with sellers' draftsmen of standard form
contracts. In many situations it seems apparent to a bystander that the seller's
intention was to disclaim but, because in the courts' view "apt language
'27
was not used, the court states that the presumed intention of the seller must
have been not to disclaim or, at the least, the purchaser's presumed intention
must have been that there was no disclaimer on the part of the seller. In fact,
the purchaser is probably oblivious to the particular language of the disclaimer
clause, notwithstanding the fiction of presumed intentions through construc-
tion, whether or not "apt language" has been used.
1. The language of the disclaimer clause is to be construed within the context
of the language of the disclaimer clause itself.
To successfully disclaim the implied conditions and warranties of the
Sale of Goods Act "there must be between the vendor and the purchaser a
clear distinct contract resulting in that effect". 28 In the absence of words of
24 For a discussion of this rule of construction, and other rules as to construction,
see generally, Studies in Canadian Business Law, (Fridman ed., Butterworth and Co.:
Toronto, 1971) at 1-25.
2 5 See, for example, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s.53.
26R.S.O. 1970, c.421, s.15A.
27 Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes, [1911] A.C. 394.
28 Windsor v. Simmons et al., [19081 5 E.LR. 139 (P.E.I. S.C.).
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exclusion the implied conditions apply even if there is no express agreement
on the point. In the words of Lord Loreburn, "If it is desired by a seller to
throw the risk of any honest mistake on to the buyer then he must use apt
language". 20 However, once apt language is used, the court, in Allcock v.
Manitoba Windmill and Pump Company0 explains why the implied terms
imposed by the Sale of Goods Act are then excluded.
The legislature provided for Purchaser's certain protection; but that protection
the plaintiff in this case set aside when he signed the contract containing a clause
expressly taking it away; and, the plaintiff having signed the contract, the law
holds him to what he expressly agreed to. The Court cannot make agreements
for the parties ... [Pleople ... are allowed ... to enter into these contracts if
they feel disposed to; and ... the Courts cannot do anything except hold that
the parties are bound by their provisions. 8 '
A problem arises because the courts are inconsistent in the construction
of the language of disclaimer clauses. Undoubtedly this is in part because the
construction is often artificial and requires subtle reasoning to achieve the
adverse construction and desired result. Subsequent courts sometimes find it
difficult to find their way through the maze, and may enforce a clause simply
because the wording of the clause has met with previous approval.
Nevertheless, the construction of the language of the disclaimer clause
simply within the wording of the disclaimer clause itself has afforded courts a
significant tool with which to avoid the operation of disclaimer clauses.
Thus, the particular wording of the disclaimer clause in The Canadian
Fairbanks-Morse Co. v. Teightmeyer 2 destroyed its intended effectiveness.
The clause said: "the above terms and conditions and the warranty herein
described ... contain all the representations, conditions and warranties,
general, express and implied and made to me by the vendor or its agents
during the negotiations for sale." 33 Since the statutory implied conditions
arise by implication of law and therefore were not "made ... during negotia-
tions", the disclaimer clause was held not to exclude the implied terms.
Similarly, Freeman v. Consolidated Motors Ltd.34 presents another example
of ineffective wording. The buyer had made known his particular purpose
to the seller, but the car was unsafe to drive at high speeds due to a twisted
frame. The Purchase Order contained a clause which read: "Vendor shall
not be liable for any defects in material or workmanship pertaining to the
said goods not known to the vender at the date hereof".3 5 It was held that
this would not be effective to contract out of the implied conditions for the
Idisclaimer clause did not mention, at least literally, contracting out of the
implied conditions.30
2
9 Supra, note 27 at 396.
80 (1911), 18 W.L.R. 77 (Sask).
31 Id., at 82.
82 (1921), 60 D.L.R. 272 (Alta. CA.).
83 Id., at 274.
84 (1968), 65 W.W.R. 234 (Man. Q.B.).
85 Id., at 239.
80 Id., at 239.
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Sawyer and Massey Co. v. Thibart37 involved the sale of a thresher
and the contract contained a disclaimer clause which limited liability to
defective parts or replacement of the machine. The court held that on a strict
construction the limited liability clause only related to an express warranty
given, namely, that the machine would "do as good work as any of the same
size sold in Canada". 38 It was held that the express warranty was not incon-
sistent with the implied condition that the machine be fit for a particular pur-
pose made known to the seller. The court relied upon the statutory provision
similar to section 15. 4. of the Ontario Sale of Goods Act.39 Therefore, as
there was a breach of the implied condition that the goods be fit for a parti-
cular purpose, the purchaser was given damages.40
Similarly, in Sawyer and Massey Co. v. Thomas G. Ritchie41 the
Supreme Court of Canada considered a disclaimer clause which provided
inter alia that the purchaser of a threshing machine give "ten days notice
after starting"42 of dissatisfaction, and the court held on a strict construction
that this provision did not apply to an express warranty that the threshing
machine was "made of good materials" and would be "durable with good
care".
43
The House of Lords decision in Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes44
is the most often cited case in a line of cases which have held that the implied
conditions are not excluded by simply excluding all "warranties". In Wallis,
the seed delivered did not correspond to the kind of seed described in the
contract. There was a clause in the contract asserting that "seller gives no
warranty, express or implied as to growth, description, or any other matter".45
This was held to not exclude the implied condition requiring the goods to
correspond with their description. Lord Alverson, C. J., in discussing the
various conditions of the Sale of Goods Act, said:
I think every section shows that the distinction between 'condition' and 'warranty'
is clearly understood and recognized and that different remedies are intended to
be given in the one case and in the other. For that reason I submit it is impos-
sible for the respondents to contend that when the sellers said they gave no war-
ranty they meant to say they would not be responsible for any breaches of con-
dition.4 6
His Lordship then pointed out the various sections of the Act which
show Parliament's intention that conditions and warranties are two separate
types of terms, with different ramifications for their respective breach.
47
37 (1907), 5 W.L.R. 241 (N.W. Provinces H.C.).
38 ld., at 243.
39 Id., at 248.
401d., at 255.
41 (1910), 43 S.C.R. 614.
42 Id., at 625.
43 Id., at 622.
44 [1911] A.C. 394 (H.L.).
45 Id., at 395.
46 Id., at 396-97 [emphasis added].
47 Id., at 397-98.
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In Marshall v. Ryan Motors Ltd.48 the car purchased was not fit for the
particular purpose becausen it kept breaking down. There was a 30 month
defective parts warranty which had expired and a clause saying "that no
other warranty, guarantee or representation whatsoever has been made
'49
other than the standard warranty printed on the back of the contract. The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the implied condition that the car
be fit for a particular purpose was not excluded by these words.
In Cork v. Greavette Boats Ltd.60 the disclaimer clause only excluded
implied warranties and Henderson J. A. concluded therefore that the implied
condition of fitness for a particular purpose was not excluded when, in respect
to a boat which was meant to be a pleasure boat, the engine, exhaust and
steering were never installed properly.51
In the recent Ontario case of Canada Building Materials Ltd. v. W. R.
Meadows of Canada Ltd.52 there was a clause which read:
We warrant our materials to be of good quality and will replace materials proved
defective. This warranty is in lieu of all others express or implied and may not
be extended by representatives ... We in no way guarantee ... performance
under special conditions.5 3
The warranty containing the exculpatory clause was held not to avail the
seller on another ground, but it was added "in any event even if such a
limited warranty were held to be applicable it could not include conditions
as to fitness for purpose implied under section 15". 54
In Alabastine Co., Paris Ltd. v. Canada Producer and Gas Engine Co.
Ltd.15 the Ontario Court of Appeal relied upon Wallis v. Pratt56 to hold that
the following clause did not use apt language to exclude liability for breach of
the implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose nor for the breach of
the condition of the motor to fit the description of 250 h.p.
It is expressly agreed there are no promises, agreements or undertakings outside
this contract with reference to the subject matter; that no agent ... has any
authority [to impose terms] not herein expressed.57
It was held that:
mhe language of the provision is more appropriate to express promises, agree-
ments or understandings than to an agreement or condition which the law implies
from a given state of circumstances; and if the appellant intended that such an
agreement or condition should be excluded clear language should have been
used to express that intention.
58
48 (1922), 65 D.L.R. 742 (Sask. CA.).
49 Id., at 744.
50 [1940] 4 D.L.R. 202 (Ont. C.A.).
51 Id., at 205, 206.
52 (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 674 (Ont.H.C.).
5s Id., at 679.
5 4Id., at 680.
65 (1914), 17 D.L.R. 813 (Ont. CA.).
56 Supra, note 44.
57 Supra, note 55 at 280.
15 d., at 281.
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The court in McNichol v. Dominion Motors Ltd.59 also dealt with a
provision in a document which asserted that the document "comprised the
entire agreement and no other agreement of any kind, verbal or otherwise,
would be recognized"00 , and held that such provision did not exclude the con-
dition or warranties implied by the Sale of Goods Act, relying upon Ala-
bastine. In this case there was a manufacturer's warranty as part of the
agreement, but a provision asserting that this was the only "warranty" was
held not to exclude the implied condition of fitness for a particular purpose.
Having discussed cases where apt language was not used it is useful to
now discuss some cases which have held that apt language was used and
why the language was held to be effective.
There are several cases where disclaimer clauses were held to be opera-
tive as the wording of the clauses excluded both express and implied condi-
tions and warranties.
In Reeves and Co. v. Chase6 ' the clause
the buyer expressly agrees that said machinery is not sold by description and
that there are no conditions or warranties either general, express, or implied,
other than the conditions and warranty set forth below
62
was held to be enough to negative the implied conditions and warranties that
would otherwise arise by operation of law. Ailcock v. Manitoba Windmill Co.
Ltd.0 3 dealt with a similarly worded clause and it was held that the clause
effectively excluded the implied conditions of the Sale of Goods Act.
In Advance-Rumley Thresher Co. v. Lester et al." The Ontario Court
of Appeal held that a clause in a contract which provided "There are no con-
ditions express or implied statutory or otherwise other than those contained
in the written agreement.. ."" was effective to exclude the implied condition
that the goods were fit for a particular purpose made known to the seller.
Here the purchaser sought to purchase a tractor capable of pulling a separator
up "any of the hills". 66
A year later, in Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Armour7 the Ontario
High Court followed Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Lester although the
Court of Appeal reversed the decision on other grounds. In this case there
was an express warranty that the goods were "well made and of good mate-
rial and.., capable of performing well the work for which they are intend-
ed"68 but it was limited to complaints made within a certain time and within
a certain manner, a procedure which was not followed. The court said that
59 [1930] 3 D.L.R. 270 (Alta. CA.).
601d., at 271.
61 (1909), 11 W.L.R. 459 (Alta. CA.).
62 Id., at 459.
6sSupra, note 30.
0 [1927] 4 D.LR. 51 (Ont. CA.).
65 Id., at 60 (refers to passage in trial judgement).
66 Id., at 55.
67 [1928] 2 D.LR. 615 (Ont. H.C.).
68 Id., at 616.
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because there was a disclaimer clause that said "there are no rights, warran-
ties or conditions, express or applied, statutory or otherwise, other than those
herein contained", the buyer was deprived of the benefit of the implied con-
ditions of the Sale of Goods Act.69
Similarly, in Godsoe v. Beatty70 the implied conditions of fitness and
merchantability under the Sale of Goods Act were excluded by another,
similar, clause which read:
Purchaser acknowledges that this agreement constitutes the entire contract and
there are no representations, warranties or conditions, express or implied, statu-
tory or otherwise, other than as contained herein. 7'
2. The language of the disclaimer clause is to be construed within the context
of the wording of the contract document(s) as a whole.
The courts have employed the traditional rules of construction to deter-
mine the presumed intentions of the parties by considering the language of the
disclaimer clause within the context of the wording of the contract as a whole.
In Hart-Parr Co. v. Jones72 the court held that a disclaimer clause
which asserted that a tractor engine sold was "not sold by description" was
held to be ineffective when the tractor engine purchased was used rather than
new, as represented. The court held that the defect was "a difference in kind"
rather than quality and that the disclaimer clause "cannot be held to alter the
subject matter of the sale ... [as the] order is still an order for a specified
engine".73
In Schofield v. Emerson Brantingham Implement Company74 the con-
tract was for delivery of a tractor capable of producing 30 h.p. and contained
a one year defective parts warranty:
Made upon the express conditions that [it] contains all the terms and conditions
of the sale ... and cannot, in any manner, be changed ... without the written
consent of the officers [of the company]75
Anglin, I. said that he need not consider whether this clause excluded the
implied conditions under the Sale of Goods Act because there was an express
term that it would develop 30 h.p. in the contract. 7 In discussing the dis-
claimer clause, Fitpatrick, C. I. used Wallis v. Pratt77 as authority to say that
the purchaser would have- been entitled to recover damages because if what
the seller had delivered "had been something different from what was ordered
... the conditions of sale have no application". 78
60 Id., at 621.
70 (1959), 19 D.LR. (2d) 265 (N.B. CA.).
71 Id., at 265.
72 [1917] 2 W.W.R. 888 (Sask.H.C.).
78 Id., at 891.
74 (1918), 43 D.L.R. 509, 57 S.C.R. 203.
75 Id., at 209.
76 Id., at 219-20.
77 [1911] A.C. 394 (H.L.). See supra, note 44 and accompanying text, and infra,
note 90
78Supra, note 74 at 205.
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Similarly, in Canada Foundry Co. Ltd. v. Edmonton Portland Cement
Co.79 the Privy Council held that a clause disclaiming responsibility for loss
from delay was ineffective, because to construe the clause literally and give
effect to it would mean that the seller would never have to deliver, notwith-
standing that an express date for delivery was set forth in the contract. The
document had to be construed as a whole and therefore the seller was held
to have an obligation to deliver within a reasonable time after the date speci-
fied for delivery, and was responsible for damages for the failure to do so,
notwithstanding the disclaimer clause. To give effect simply to the literal
wording of the disclaimer clause would really result in a failure of con-
sideration.
The written contract of sale contained the following clause:
The Company shall not be responsible or liable for any direct or indirect damage,
loss, stoppage or delay which the purchaser may sustain, whether the said plant
or machinery is specified for any particular purpose or not.80
Lord Atkinson held in respect to the clause:
Literally construed it would mean that the appellants might delay the shipment,
delivery, or erection of this steel frame as often and as long as it seemed good to
them. That would be in itself an irrational result, and besides would be altogether
irreconcilable with the earlier provision binding them to deliver the plant and
machinery with due despatch. The document must be construed as a whole, effect
being, as far as possible, given to each part. And the only way in which that can
be done is to hold either that the second clause does not at all apply to the
plant and machinery mentioned in the earlier clause of the document, or that if it
does apply to them it was only intended to protect the appellants from being
responsible for consequential damage. Their Lordships are, however, like the
learned trial Judge and the Court of Appeal, of opinion that it does not apply to
such breaches of contract as the long delayed shipment, delivery, or erection of
the steel frame contracted for. It cannot, therefore, in itself, furnish any defence
to the respondents' counterclaim.s' - -
Similarly, in Massey-Harris Co. v. Skelding8 2 the Alberta Court of
Appeal held that where a tractor sold was "valueless" the breach constituted
a "total failure of consideration" and therefore the disclaimer clause was
ineffective. More recently, in Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd. v. Fleetwood Logging
Sales Ltd.a the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that a disclaimer
clause was ineffective, because the "duty ... to deliver the crane in good
condition was absolute", this obligation being "the foundation upon which the
contract was built".8s
In R. W. Heron Paving Ltd. v. Dilworth Equipment Ltd.85 the Ontario
High Court approved of the reasoning in Schofield."" The purchase in this
case was in respect to an asphalt plant under a contract which included a
clause "[t]he terms and conditions herein contained represent the complete
79 [1918] 3 W.W.R. 866 (P.C.) (Alta.).
801d., at 868.
'lId., at 872 [emphasis added].
82 [1933] 4 D.LR. 303 (Alta. CA.).
83(1962), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 631 (B.C. CA.).
84 Id., at 633.
85 (1963), 36 D.L.R. (2d) 462 (Ont.H.C.).
86 Supra, note 74.
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agreement between the Vendor and Purchaser" and "no salesman ... has
any authority to make any others .. .,,.8 The purchasers were held to have
made their purpose known, which was to buy a plant capable of producing
4,000 pounds of asphalt per day and to have relied upon the seller's skill or
judgment, when in fact the plant could only produce 3,600 pounds. s s
Although it was held that the disclaimer clause excluded the salesman's
representation regarding delivery and adaptability, it was held that the
clause did not exclude the implied condition of fitness for a particular pur-
pose. The court held that the clause and breach was similar to that in the
Schofield case. 9
Similarly, in Sloan v. Empire Motors Ltd. and Vancouver Finance Co.
Ltd.90 in an action for breach of the obligation of the seller to convey title
to a used car, the defendant seller relied upon a disclaimer clause which read,
in part:
There are no representations, warranties or conditions, express or implied, statu-
tory or otherwise, other than those herein contained nor shall any agreement
collateral hereto be binding upon the seller unless it is in writing hereupon or
attached hereto, and duly signed by the seller.91
The court held that by reason of the words "other than those herein con-
tained" the disclaimer clause did not exclude the warranties contained in
the agreement. 2 Therefore, in considering the operative words of the con-
ditional sale agreement, which read that the purchaser ".... hereby purchases
and agrees to pay for ... the following property ... delivery and acceptance
... hereby acknowledged" with the good being purchased described as a
"used ... 1952 ... Ford ... Sedan",93 the court held that "the general
property [in the car] was the subject-matter of the agreement", 94 and this
interpretation was further supported by clauses in the contract which indi-
cated that the extent of the title reserved to the seller was simply a security
interest until payment of the full purchase price.95 The purchaser was there-
fore successful in claiming damages.96
C. The Fundamental Breach Approach in Respect to Disclaimer Clauses
Although the British courts are credited with the creation of the doctrine
of fundamental breach97 in the early 1950's, British and Canadian courts
have really been using the principles underlying the doctrine without the label
87 Supra, note 85 at 466.
88 Id., at 464-5, 469.
89 Id., at 469.
00 (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 53 (B.C. CA.).
01 Id., at 66, 75.
92 Id.
03 Id., at 76.
941d.
0 5 Id., at 66, 76-7.
D0 Cf., but query, Gratton v. Forest City Motors, [1954] O.W.N. 167, in which the
Ontario Court of Appeal held that the implied condition of title had been successfully
excluded.
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for over fifty years. The doctrine simply represents a new manifestation of
the approach of the traditional rules of construction already discussed.
The case law which has asserted as a rule of substantive law that a party
could not contract out of his fundamental obligations will be reviewed first,
and then the impact of the House of Lords decision in Suisse Atlantique
Soci6t D'Armement Maritime S.A. v. N.V. Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale
8
will be discussed. The final task will be to assess what the courts in reality
are doing in applying the doctrine of fundamental breach.
1. Fundamental breach as a doctrine of substantive law
The decision of the English Court of Appeal in Karsales (Harrow)
Ltd. v. Wallis99 is generally regarded as the beginning of the view that
simply as a matter of substantive law a disclaimer clause cannot exclude
liability where the seller has committed a fundamental breach.
In that case the defendant inspected a second-hand Buick car in ex-
cellent condition and intimated that he wished to buy it on hire-purchase
terms. The car was sold to a finance company which then contracted to let
it on hire-purchase to the defendant.
About a week later the vehicle was left late at night outside the defendant's
garage. He examined it next morning and found that it was the same Buick car
which he had previously inspected, in the sense that it had the same body and
engine and registration number; but it had been badly damaged. It had evidently
been towed in; there was a rope attached to the front bumper; and tyres had
been changed, the new tyres being taken off and the old ones put on; the wire-
less set had been removed from it; the chrome strips round the body were miss-
ing; and when the defendant had a fitter look at the engine, the cylinder head
was found to be off, all the valves were burnt, and there were two broken pistons.
The car would not go.100
The hire-purchase contract contained the following clause:
No condition or warranty that the vehicle is roadworthy, or as to its age, condi-
tion or fitness for any purpose is given by the owner or implied therein.'
0 '
Although the facts seemed to suggest clearly that relief should be granted
the trial judge held, employing the traditional rules of construction,
that all the representations in the contract were covered by the language of the
exemption clause ... and that accordingly, unfortunate as it might be, any condi-
tion or warranty in the transaction must be excluded from his consideration; and
that after a party had signed such a contract, then, although a car in a totally
different condition was delivered, the party could not complain, but was bound
by the agreement.
102
97 In Wallis v. Pratt, supra, note 27, Lord Loreburn said at 395:
"If a man agrees to sell something of a particular description he cannot require
the buyer to take something which is of a different description and the sale of
goods by description implies the condition that the goods shall correspond to
it.,$
98 [1967] 1 A.C. 361 (H.L).
99 [1956] 1 W.LR. 936 (CA.).
1001 d., at 938.
101 Id., at 937-8.
102 Id., at 939.
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Perhaps relief might have been granted by holding on the particular
facts of the case that there was a wilful breach and that such a breach was
outside of the scope of the exempting clause. However, this approach would
have impliedly sanctified the clause in situations not involving a wilful breach
and without a doubt the buyer reasonably expected not only that the seller
would not intentionally damage the vehicle, but also that he would deliver to
the purchaser the car that he had first inspected.
In the Court of Appeal, Denning, L. J. spoke of a substantive rule of
law having been developed in respect to disclaimer clauses:
notwithstanding earlier cases which might suggest the contrary, it is now settled
that exempting clauses of this kind no matter how widely they are expressed,
only avail the party when he is carrying out his contract in its essential respects.
He is not allowed to use them as a cover for misconduct or indifference or to
enable him to turn a blind eye to his obligations. They do not avail him when
he is guilty of a breach that goes to the root of the contract.103
Denning, L. 1. then set forth the approach by which a court could determine
ths substance of the seller's obligations (and hence the purchaser's reasonable
expectations):
The thing to do is to look at the contract apart from the exempting clauses and
see what are the terms, express or implied, which impose an obligation on the
party. If he has been guilty of a breach of those obligations in a respect which
goes to the very root of the contract, he cannot rely on the exempting clauses ...
The principle is sometimes said to be that the party cannot rely on an exempting
clause when he delivers something "different in kind" from that contracted for,
or has broken a "fundamental term" or a "fundamental contractual obligation",
but these are, I think, all comprehended by the general principle that a breach
which goes to the root of the contract disentitles the party relying on the exempt-
ing clause.' 04
Lord Justice Denning had no difficulty in holding on the particular facts of
the case, the car delivered being in a "deplorable state", 05 that the breach
did go to the root of the contract and accordingly the hire-purchase company
was. not entitled to rely on the disclaimer clause. 106
Apart from the particular facts of the case, there is some justification
in terms of traditional contract principles for the general proposition asserted
by Lord Justice Denning. If the purchaser does rely upon the seller's skill
and judgment as provided in section 15. 1.107 of the Sale of Goods Act then
he is entitled as a matter of law to the protection of the implied condition of
section 15. 1. Similarly, if the purchaser relies upon express promises to his
detriment he is entitled to rely upon the law affording him the necessary
remedy so as to provide him with his expectation interest. A disclaimer clause
purporting to deprive a purchaser of that protection and reliance can have no
validity if it is asserted unilaterally by the seller, but can come about only
through agreement. 08
103 Id., at 940 [emphasis added].
104 Id., at 940-41.
1051 d., at 941.
10l Id.
107 R.S.O. 1970 c.421.
108 As permitted by s.53 of the Sale of Goods Act R.S.O. 1970, c.421. Note, of
course, that s.53 is now limited in the consumer sale by the recently enacted s.29a of
the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.82, as am.
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As a rule, when the purchaser signs the contract, the formal require-
ments of agreement are met. 09 However, that should not conclude the ques-
tion, for in order to enforce the agreement against the purchaser the seller
must show that the consideration which has been promised has actually been
received by the purchaser. If the consideration underlying the asserted
promise of the purchaser not to hold the seller to his obligations under
section 15. 1. (i.e. the disclaimer clause) has failed, the purchaser is entitled to
disaffirm or repudiate that obligation. The weakness with this argument is
that where the disclaimed clause asserts that no promise has been made at
all by the seller, the argument becomes circular. To find a breach going to
the root of the contract, it is necessary first to find a promise and the question
then is how can such a promise be found where the disclaimer clause ex-
pressly says that no promise has been made and the purchaser by his signa-
ture has apparently agreed to this.110 On the other hand, it could then be
argued that the purchaser has not received any consideration (unless consi-
deration can otherwise be found) in the first instance and therefore no
binding obligation arises on his part.
For example, in the Karsales case, Lord Denning found that the seller
had promised a car otherwise than a car in a "deplorable state" and Birkett,
L.J. found a duty "to supply to the defendant a 'car', in the ordinary sense
of that term and not something that needed towing, because in the true
meaning of words a car that would not go was not a car at all.""'
Once the promise had been found, a finding of a breach of that promise
could follow as a matter of course. But the question remains as to how such
a promise could be found (looking simply at the written contract) in the face
of express wording that the seller made no promise that the "vehicle is road-
worthy, or as to its age, condition or fitness for any purpose...",."12
On the facts of the case it was held that the buyer reasonably expected
to receive a car suitable for normal purposes and the seller's obligation was
therefore to supply a roadworthy vehicle. The court held the disclaimer
clause to be ineffective when it was found that the buyer's reasonable expec-
tation was really to have delivered to him "the car I had seen before and
which I would like to have", 13 rather than as suggested by simply the written
words of the contract.
Similarly, in Knowles v. Anchorage Holdings Co."14 Mr. Justice Verchere
followed Karsales and found the following clause of no value to the seller in
the case of "an engine that would [not] operate as it should have"." 5
10 9 See supra, note 4.
310 Cf. Lord Wilberforce in Suisse Atlantique, supra, note 98, at 431:
"An act which, apart from the exceptions clause, might be a breach suffi-
ciently serious to justify refusal of further performance, may be reduced in
effect, or made not a breach at all, by the terms of the clause." [emphasis
added]
"'1 Karsales, supra, note 99 at 942.
112 Id., at 937-38.
".3 Supra, note 99 at 942.
14 (1964), 46 W.W.R. 173 (B.C. S.C).
115 Id., at 178.
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The buyer relies solely on his own judgment that the equipment ... is fit for the
purpose of which it is required ...116
The clause went on to make the usual disclaimer of warranties implied
by law. Mr. Justice Verchere found a breach of a fundamental term:
Applying these considerations to the present case, I cannot escape the conclusion
and I find that here the defendant was in breach of a fundamental term of the
contract to purchase an engine of workable character, that is to say, an engine
that would operate as it should have, and cannot therefore rely on the exemption
clause.11 7
He continued further in construing the clause:
As regards the submission ... that the plaintiff's expressed reliance on his own
judgment precluded the arising of any warranty or condition under see. 20(a)
of the Sale of Goods Act, the answer lies, in my opinion, in the lack of any
inconsistency between the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's skill or judgment
to provide an engine that would meet the fundamental obligation of an engine of
workable character and his reliance on his own judgment that a properly per-
forming engine of the capacity supplied would be suitable for his purpose. This
distinction is borne out by the complaint made by him here, which was not that
the engine is insufficient or inadequate but rather that it is unsuitable because
it has consistently failed to function as it should. The fault with the engine is not
that it was, for example, too small or too light to provide adequate power. The
complaint concerned the ability of the engine to function as an engine should and
this was a matter on which the plaintiff had neither the opportunity nor the abi-
lity to form a judgment. In these circumstances, I hold that the words above
referred to do not preclude the existence of an implied condition or warranty
that the engine would, when supplied, be workable and that as there was a
breach of this term the plaintiff is entitled to relief.118
There really could be no doubt that a buyer would expect, at the least,
an engine which could perform substantially the function of an engine.
Similarly, it was held in Canadian-Dominion Leasing Corporation v.
Suburban Superdrug Limited"9 that a buyer would, at a minimum,
expect an "automated" commercial display case device to be capable of self
propulsion. 120 In Lightburn v. Belmont Sales Limited'2' it was held that a
buyer would not expect a new Ford Cortina to be "so defective and so
unreliable ... that it had to be returned for repairs ... no less than 17
times"' 22 in eight months.
Although the courts have sought to define fundamental breach so as to
differentiate it from a breach of the condition implied in section 15. 1. of the
Sale of Goods Act (which therefore means that the doctrine does not over-
rule a long line of cases) the fundamental breach cases themselves leave the
reader very much in doubt whether in fact there is any real difference.
116 Id., at 176.
1177 d., at 178.
118Id., at 178-179.
119 (1966), 56 D.LR. (2d) 43 (Alta. CA.).
120 Id., at 50.
121 (1969), 6 D.LR. (3d) 692 (B.C. S.C.).
122 Id., at 695.
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For example, in Western Tractor Ltd. v. Dyck123 the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal found a fundamental breach where a tractor was not capable
of doing "the work for which it was purchased"'124 and broke down completely
after 1700 hours of use.
Similarly, in R. G. McLean Ltd. v. Canadian Vickers Ltd.125 in
which there was a contract for the purchase and sale of a printing press,
the Ontario Court of Appeal found itself able to find a fundamental breach
where the good delivered certainly was a printing press but was unable to
do "the quality of printing contemplated by both parties to the contract when
it was made ... In short, the machine simply did not do the job which it
had been purchased to do ....126
The following clause was asserted to be effective by the seller:
This condition [defective parts warranty] is in substitution for and excludes all
express conditions, warranties or liabilities of any kind relating to the goods sold
whether as to fitness or otherwise and whether arising under the Sale of Goods
Act, 1893 or other statute or in tort or by implication of law or otherwise. In
no event shall we be liable for any direct or indirect loss or damage (whether
special, consequential or otherwise) or any other claims except as provided for in
these conditions.127
In construing this clause, Mr. Justice Arnup echoed the sentiments of
Lord Atkinson in Portland Cement.
28
Notwithstanding the broad language of subcl. (e), I am unable to construe it in
the way contended for. Such a construction would, for all practical purposes,
render nugatory the prime contractual obligations of the defendant. It would make
those ostensible obligations what Lord Wilberforce called a "mere declaration of
intention": Suisse Atlantique, supra, at p. 432. In short, cl. 12 does not exclude
liability for a fundamental breach of contract resulting in performance totally
different from what the parties had in contemplation. The clause can be given
business efficacy if its operation is limited to identifiable defects due to faulty
workmanship or use of defective material, which defects can be rectified, and
which do not prevent performance of the contract as contemplated by the
parties.1
29
It therefore seems that if a buyer has relied upon a seller's expertise no
language will defeat that reliance.1
30
2. Suisse Atlantique: A return to the traditional rules of construction
In order to assess the impact of the decision of the House of Lords in
Suisse Atlantique Societe d'Armement Maritime S.A. v. Rotterdamsche Kolen
123 (1969), 70 W.W.R. 215 (Sask. CA.).
124Id., at 217, 220, 223.
125 [1971] 1 O.R. 207 (Ont. CA.).
126.d., at 210.
127 Id., at 209.
128 Supra, note 79 and accompanying text.
129 Supra, note 125 at 212 [emphasis added].
130 At one point Arnup, LA. refers to the breach as a "breach of condition". Id.,
at 212.
1972]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Centrale"3' it should be emphasized that in post-Karsales but pre-Suisse
Atlantique decisions, the court would construe the contract apart from
the exempting clause to find the seller's prime obligation, find a fundamental
breach of that obligation, and then declare that as there was a fundamental
breach the exempting clause could not be relied upon. Although the Karsales
doctrine was sometimes asserted as a doctrine of substantive law, that deci-
sion and the decisions following it could have been decided on a basis of
liberally employing the traditional rules of construction, with the court con-
sidering all of the relevant evidence to ascertain and give effect to the true
expectations.
The facts of Suisse Atlantique as set out in the headnote were as follows:
On December 31, 1956, the respondents agreed to charter a vessel from the
appellants for the carriage of coal from the United States (East Coast) to Europe,
the vessel returning in ballast between each voyage. The charter was to remain
in force for a total of two years consecutive voyages. Fixed periods of laytime
were provided within which the respondents were obliged respectively to load
and discharge the vessel on each voyage and demurrage was payable, subject to
certain exceptions, at the rate of 1,000 dollars a day. Between October 16, 1957,
and the end of the charter the vessel made eight round voyages whereas the
appellants alleged that a further six voyages could have been performed if the
loading and discharging had been completed within the laytime or a further nine
voyages if the respondents had loaded and discharged the vessel with reasonable
dispatch.1 3
2
The written contract provided, in part:
3. The cargo to be loaded into vessel at the average rate of 1,500 tons per run-
ning day ... if longer detained charterer to pay $1,000 U.S. currency per running
day (or pro rata for part thereof) demurrage.
8. The cargo to be taken from alongside by consignee at port of discharge, free
of expense and risk to the vessel, at the average rate of (clause No. 22) tons per
day ... if longer detained, consignee to pay vessel demurrage at the rate of
$1,000 U.S. currency per running day (or pro rata for part thereof).1a5
In the House of Lords, the appellants (plaintiffs) contended that the
breaches of contract which caused the delays amounted to a fundamental
breach or a breach going to the root of the contract and accordingly such
breach prevented the respondents from relying on the demurrage clause
limiting their liability.
The House of Lords found on the particular facts of the case that no
fundamental breach of contract had been committed. However, their Lord-
ships undertook a general consideration and review of the doctrine.
The court was unanimous in holding that there was no rule of substan-
tive law that a party to a contract, having committed a fundamental breach of
that contract, was not entitled to rely on an exemption clause.184 The court
131 [1967] 1 A.C. 361 (I.L.).
132 Id., at 361.
18 Id., at 364.
184 Id., at 392 (Viscount Dilhome), 399, 400 (Lord Reid), 410 (Lord Hodson),
425, 426 (Lord Upjohn) and 423 (Lord Wilberforce).
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was also almost unanimous in characterizing "fundamental breach" as nothing
more than a new name for a very old concept.1
3 5
The reasoning and the terminology of the earlier cases was disapproved
of, although the results were not. It is submitted that what really concerned
their Lordships was the suggestion of an inflexible rule of law designed to
protect reasonable expectations in the usual consumer type of sale which,
loosely applied, might paradoxically defeat true expectations in the circum-
stances of a truly commercial sale.
Certainly on the facts of Suisse Atlantique,136 it seems that the appellants
possessed the same bargaining power as the respondents and were, in effect,
asking the court to release them from what turned out to be bad bargain freely
entered into. Lord Reid said:
Exemption clauses differ greatly in many respects. Probably the most objection-
able are found in the complex standard conditions which are now so common.
In the ordinary way the customer has no time to read them, and if he did read
them he would probably not understand them. And if he did understand and
object to any of them, he would generally be told he could take it or leave it.
And if he then went to another supplier the result would be the same. Freedom
to contract must surely imply some choice or room for bargaining.
At the other extreme is the case where parties are bargaining on terms of equality
and a stringent exemption clause is accepted for a quid pro quo or other good
reason. But this rule appears to treat all cases alike. There is no indication in the
recent cases that the courts are to consider whether the exemption is fair in all
the circumstances or is harsh and unconscionable or whether it was freely agreed
by the customer. And it does not seem to me to be satisfactory that the decision
must always go one way if, e.g. defects in a car or other goods are just sufficient
to make the breach of contract a fundamental breach, but must always go the
other way if the defects fall just short of that. This is a complex problem which
intimately affects millions of people and it appears to me that its solution should
be left to parliament. If your Lordships reject this new rule there will certainly
be a need for urgent legislative action but that is not beyond reasonable expecta-
tion ... The appellants chose to agree to what they now say was an inadequate
sum for demurrage ... 137
1
35 Id., Lord Reid stating at 397:
"General use of the term 'fundamental breach' is of recent origin and I can
find nothing to indicate that it means either more or less than the well known
type of breach which entitles the innocent party to treat it as repudiatory
and to rescind the contract."
Lord Hodson stated at 409-10:
" .. . the expression 'fundamental breach' is of comparatively recent origin
and has attained some mystical meaning in the law of contract. For my part,
I doubt whether anything is to be gained by analysing the various expressions
which have been used to describe breaches of contract if he so chooses."
Lord Upjohn stated at 421:
"I believe that all of our Lordships are agreed and indeed it has not seriously
been disputed before us that there is no magic in the words 'fundamental
breach'; this expression is no more than a convenient shorthand expression for
saying that a particular breach or breaches of contract by one party is or are
such as to go to the root of the contract which entitles the other party to treat
such breach or breaches as a repudiation of the whole contract."
I3 6Supra, note 131, at 361.
187 Id., at 406-07 [emphasis added].
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Lord Reid also made clear that he would not permit a disclaimer clause
to defeat a buyer's reasonable expectation.
As a matter of construction it may appear that terms of the exclusion clause
are not wide enough to cover the kind of breach which has been committed ...
Or it may appear that the terms of the clause are so wide that they cannot be
applied literally: that may be because this would lead to an absurdity or because
it would defeat the main object of the contract or perhaps for other reasons.18s
Put more simply, Lord Reid was saying that the clause in question was
consistent with the plaintiff's reasonable expectations in the particular case.
Lord Wilberforce stated:
No formula will solve this type of question and one must look individually at
the nature of the contract, the character of the breach and its effect upon
future performance and expectation and make a judicial estimation of the final
result.1 0
Like Lord Reid, he also made clear that it was merely the principle
expressed in Karsales and in the cases following it suggesting a doctrine of
substantive law, and not their results to which he had objection:
The conception, therefore, of 'fundamental breach' as one which, through as-
certainment of the parties' contractual intention, falls outside an exceptions
clause is well recognized and comprehensible. Is there any need, or authority,
in relation to exception clauses, for extension of it beyond this? In my opinion
there is not. The principle that the contractual intention is to be ascertained -
not just grammatically from words used but by consideration of those words in
relation to commercial purpose (or other purpose according to the type of con-
tract) - is surely flexible enough, and though it may be the case that adhesion
contracts give rise to particular difficulties in ascertaining or attributing a con-
tractual intent, which may require a special solution, those difficulties need not be
imported into the general law of contract nor be permitted to deform it.140
Therefore, it is submitted the House of Lords in Suisse Atlantique was
not attempting to place a purchaser at the mercy of disclaimer clauses but
rather to preserve the discretion of the courts in situations where the expecta-
tions of the parties could be truly said to be qualified in accordance with the
disclaimer clause. If a seller, as in Suisse Atlantique, could be said to have
paid a "price" for the buyer's undertaking not to exercise his rights to the full,
the sanctity of the bargain should be preserved. Like the early decisions of
the courts of Chancery dealing with unconscionable transactions141 their
Lordships were seeking to protect persons from being victimized, but not to
protect someone who had freely agreed to what turned out to be a bad
bargain.
Therefore, the only real difference between pre and post Suisse Atlanti-
que cases is in the formula used to achieve the desired results.
For example in R. G. McLean v. Canadian Vickers Ltd.14 Mr. Justice
Arnup, rather than holding as a matter of substantive law that the clause in
188 Id., at 398.
139 Id., at 432 [emphasis added].
140 Id., at 434 [emphasis added].
141 See generally, G. H. Treitel The Law of Contract (3rd ed., Stevens and Sons,
London: 1970) at 819-825; see also infra, pp. 312-13.
142 [1971J 1 O.R. 207 (CA.).
[VOL. 10, NO. 2
Disclaimer Clauses
question could not apply in circumstances such as the breach in question,
held, construing the contract as a whole, that the parties never intended
'the clause to apply in situations involving "a breach so fundamental as to
go to the root of the contract".143
Similarly, Mr. Justice Ruttan of the British Columbia Supreme Court
in Lightburn v. Belmont Sales Ltd.'44 found Ford's standard disclaimer clause
presented no real difficulty to the buyer's suit for rescission as "cl. C2 of the
sale contract ... was never intended to cover a situation of fundamental
breach".14
The effect of Suisse Atlantique has been to truncate whatever judicial
magic the phrase "fundamental breach" may have possessed, and in its place,
to use such words as "intended" or "contemplated". 46 As argued earlier,
the real reason for the judgments given by the House of Lords was to prevent
a doctrine developed to protect persons at a seller's mercy from hardening
into a fixed rule of law which would eventually spill over into the commer-
cial situation, as in Suisse Atlantique where it might be used by one party to
escape a bad bargain freely entered into. However, the House did not arti-
culate this policy very clearly and, perhaps as a result, lawyers today are faced
with the subsequent judgment of Denning, L.J. in Harbutt's Plasticine Ltd. v.
Wayne Tank and Pump Co. Ltd.147
In that case, the defendant had contracted to instal new storage tanks
for holding styrene wax in the plaintiff's plasticine factory. The contract pro-
vided that until the plaintiffs took over the new plant, the defendant would
indemnify the plaintiffs against damage "to your property ... caused by the
negligence of ourselves or of our servants but not otherwise, ... provided
always that our total liability for loss, damage, or injury shall not exceed
the total value of the contract" which was £112,330.148 As a result of the
negligent design and installation of the equipment, the styrene wax ignited
and the plaintiffs' factory was destroyed. The plaintiffs (actually their insur-
ance company on a subrogated claim) subsequently sued for £146,581. in
damages.
Since the contract was apparently between parties of similar bargaining
power, it would appear safe to assume that it was both understood and freely
entered into. As the plaintiff was insured, it was undoubtedly in a position
to accept the risk offered to it by the seller and economically it also un-
doubtedly would have been unwise to pay a higher price to have the defend-
143ld., at 211.
144 Supra, note 121.
145Id., at 697.
146 Implicit in these words is "expectation". See Western Tractor v. Dyck, supra,
note 123 at 224:
"I do not believe, therefore, that either the plaintiff or the defendant ever
contemplated that the subject matter of the contract was a tractor which would
perform with reasonable satisfaction for only 1,700 hours." [emphasis added]
See also Gibbons v. Trapp Motors Limited (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 742 (B.C. S.C.).
147 [1970] 1 All E.R. 225.
148 Id., at 232.
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ant undertake the risk of greater liability since this would have involved, in
effect, double insurance.
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed.
Lord Justice Denning said that on the true construction of the limitation of
liability clause, it was:
limited to accidents and damage done in the course of carrying out the work
of erection, eg. lorries running away, workmen dropping tools, and so forth
... On this reading of [the clause] it does not apply to damage done by breach
of contract, such as faulty design. It does not, therefore, cover this case.149
Had he stopped there, the decision, although perhaps subject to attack
on the facts for the reasons stated above, would not have added more con-
fusion to an already confused area of law. However, (with Cross and Widgery
L. J. J. agreeing) Lord Justice Denning went on to hold, alternatively, that
the defendant's fundamental breach had automatically rescinded the contract
and that the limitation clause was then destroyed with the contract, with the
result that the plaintiff was free to sue for damages unencumbered by the
clause.'5 0 Further, it was not necessary that the plaintiff actually exercise his
option to rescind, because on the facts of the case, the defendant's funda-
mental breach had rendered further performance of the contract impossible
and accordingly rescission was automatic.
The question which must be asked is how can the plaintiffs sue for
a breach of contract if the subject matter of his action, the contract, has
been destroyed? Perhaps what Lord Denning meant was that on the facts
of Harbutt's the consideration underlying the plaintiffs promise not to sue
for damages beyond the contract price included the delivery of a workable
tank and the defendant's failure to perform its promise precluded it from
holding the plaintiff to its word.
Harbutt's deserves further discussion because it is illustrative of some
of the inadequacies of what appears to be the most recent judicial approach,
and will undoubtedly be cited favourably in the future by Canadian courts.
First, the decision confuses and distorts the traditional remedies resulting
from breach of contract. Lord Denning states that where there is a funda-
mental breach and there is still a contract open to be performed (not the
facts as held in Harbutt's) the innocent party has an option to affirm the
contract which then remains in force for both sides, each being able to sue
for past or future breaches, or to accept the fundamental breach and so
bring the contract to an end and sue for past breaches.151 If he elects the
latter course, the contract is considered to be at an end, and thus the dis-
claimer clause has fallen aside and the innocent party can sue for his full
damages.'"2
Apart from the abuse of logic in this argument (how can one sue for
damages when there is no contract?) there is an abuse of established contract
law principles.
149 Id., at 233.
150 Id., at 234.
151 Id., at 233.
152 Id.
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The common law provides for three options to the innocent party upon
the breach of a promise. Upon any breach which would result in the innocent
party receiving something substantially different from what he has contracted
for, the innocent party would have the option to:
(1) continue on with the contract and sue for damages; or
(2) treat his obligations as at an end under the contract and sue for
damages; or
(3) treat his obligations as at an end under the contract and receive
restitution of any benefits conferred upon the party in breach xr3
It is only in respect to the third alternative that the innocent party can,
in effect, ignore the contract and the disclaimer clause. In such a situation,
the innocent party is put back only in the position which he was in before
the contract was made. Similarly, if the equitable remedy of rescission is
available as a result of certain circumstances present in the formation of a
contract (e.g. misrepresentation, mistake, undue influence), the innocent
party is restored to his pre-contract position and no claim for damages will
be entertained.1 14
It is only in respect to the first two alternatives that the innocent party
can sue for damages, that is, sue for loss of expectation and be put in the
position as though the contract were performed. In either situation, as the
innocent party is suing on the contract, and contracts are voluntary obliga-
tions with no right to sue unless upon a contractual obligation, the innocent
party should be met with all of the terms of the contract, including the dis-
claimer clause subject to the over-riding issue of construing the contract to
determine the true reasonable expectations and ignoring the disclaimer clause
to the extent that it is inconsistent with such expectations.
It might be purposeful for a court in the position of Lord Denning to
simply ignore or restrict the disclaimer clause in such a situation, as he
suggests, and although it seems an easy path to distort existing principle to
achieve the result desired, it is questionable whether the end justifies the
means. Suppose that the innocent party wants to continue to perform the
contract but sue for damages. Lord Denning says that the disclaimer clause
then becomes "a matter of construction". 1 5 But why, if Lord Denning is
to give the disclaimer clause effect to the extent that it accords with the
intentions of the parties when the innocent party is continuing to perform
the contract but suing for damages, does he not suggest that the innocent
party should be similarly governed in accordance with the intentions of the
153 Restitution is available as a remedy in an action for money had and received
where money has been paid to the defendant for a consideration which has wholly
failed. If the benefit consists of services or goods an action for quantum meruit or
quantum valebat may lie. See Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1966) at 341-44.
'54 Subject of course to the so-called claim for "indemnity" which is probably
more properly viewed as available only to effect a proper restoration of benefits con-
ferred. See Goff & Jones, id., at 126-27.
155 Supra, note 147, at 235.
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parties (as determined by construction) when the innocent party does not
wish to continue to perform the contract?
In the latter situation, to the extent that the recovery of damages exceeds
the true expectations of the parties through the contract (including the dis-
claimer clause, subject to construction) there is a windfall and unjust en-
richment in favour of the innocent party, or conversely, a penalty (tradition-
ally outlawed) imposed upon the party in breach, simply because he is in
breach. This approach amounts, somewhat paradoxically, to a restriction
upon freedom to contract with resulting uncertainty in the planning and allo-
cation of risks.
Although the innocent party is discharged in respect to future obliga-
tions, the disclaimer clause should exist in respect to past or defectively
performed obligations. Therefore, the party in breach may rely upon the
disclaimer clause (subject to construction) just as the innocent party may
rely upon other provisions of the contract to support his claim for damages.
The present Canadian position, based on Suisse Atlantique,156 appears
to be that disclaimer clauses are a matter of construction of the contract.
Harbutt's has not yet been cited in a reported decision.'
5 7
3. Summary and Conclusions in Respect to the Doctrine of Fundamental
Breach
The doctrine of "fundamental breach' or "breach of a fundamental
term"' 58 really amounts simply to a further refinement of the traditional rules
of construction. The Canadian courts have employed rules of construction in
interpreting contracts similar to the British development in this regard. The
thrust of the primarily used rule of construction is that a disclaimer clause is
strictly construed against the drafter-seller seeking to rely upon same. This
is a logical position given the fact that the disclaimer clause seeks to derogate
from what would usually be considered the reasonable expectation of the
purchaser.
156Supra, note 131.
157 However, the recent decision of Canadian Blackwood Hodge Atlantic Ltd. v.
Kelly (1972), 3 N.S.R.(2) 49 (C.A.) is interesting. Appellants rented a rock crusher
and alleged a breach of the implied warranty of fitness. The Court decided in favour
of the respondent on other grounds. However, in discussing fundamental breach, with-
out any reference to the Harbutt's decision [1970] 1 All E.R. 225, Cooper, J.A. inter-
preted the Suise Atlantique decision in such i way as to come to the same view of the
law as Lord Denning in Harbutts, i.e. that if the innocent party elects to bring the
contract to an end and sue for damages "the clause excluding liability [does not]
continue to apply. .... " (at 59). The court failed to understand that where the
innocent party has such an option, it is simply to treat his obligation (rather than all
the contractual provisions, including the disclaimer clause) as at an end and sue for
damages. Both Lord Denning (at 234) and Cooper, J.A. (at 59) arrive at their
view through an interpretation of a confusing obiter dictum of Lord Reid in Suisse
Atlantique, [1967] 1 A.C. 361 at 398. See Denning at 234 [1970] 1 All E.R. 225.
158 Although the court in Suisse Atlantique set forth a distinction between "funda-
mental breach" and "breach of fundamental term" the distinction is unimportant for
the purposes of this article.
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Therefore, any such clause should be spelled out clearly so that the
otherwise presumptive intention of the parties is overborne by the asserted
intention as expressed by the disclaimer clause. An ambiguity is to be re-
solved in favour of the purchaser for the reason that the disclaimer clause
derogates from the reasonable expectation on the part of the purchaser pre-
sumptively arising from the seller's promise to sell and deliver a given good
of a given quality.
The traditional rule of construction includes a consideration of strictly
construing the language of the complete agreement, as well as strictly con-
struing the words within the limited context of simply the disclaimer clause.
The disclaimer clause must be construed to be rendered consistent with the
rest of the agreement, that is, the basic promise to provide and deliver a
given good of a given quality. Such construction is in accord with the pre-
sumed intentions of the parties based upon the traditional objective theory
of interpreting a given contract.
The traditional rule of strict construction approach, notwithstanding its
shortcomings, perhaps continues to serve the interests of the courts today as
well as the more recent "fundamental breach" doctrine, because the use of
the label "fundamental breach" may cause as many problems as it solves.
Employing the traditional rule of strict construction, a court today can
(and does, but now often speaks in terms of "fundamental breach") look at the
price term, the description of the goods sold, delivery date, etc. as indicating
that certain promises (rather than pseudo-obligations) were given by the
seller with resulting reasonable expectations on the part of the purchaser.
Therefore, a disclaimer clause must necessarily be construed to not restrict
the realization of such expectations. The purchaser expected to get a product
of a given quality for the price paid, and the seller would, or should, realize
that the purchaser had such expectations. The seller should be bound to
fulfll them. Thus, traditional contract principles (construing a contract on
the objective theory) can be employed, with discretion exercised by the court
in construing what it determines the true expectations to be. There is, of
course, often the additional problem presented in respect to the admissi-
bility of evidence as to oral representations, because of the parol evidence
rule and disclaimer provisions which seek to exclude oral evidence from
being admissible. These may or may not impede the court's discretion in a
given litigious situation in its consideration of all of the relevant evidence in
determining the true expectations of the purchaser.
It perhaps is easier for a court simply to paste a convenient label, "fun-
damental breach", upon such a situation, holding that there cannot be a
disclaiming of responsibility by the seller in respect to a given nonfulfilment
of contractual expectations. In one sense, this development evidences a
significant example of judicial creativity. However, the traditional rules of
strict construction when applied liberally to the complete (i.e. written and
oral) agreement, deal with the problem as satisfactorily. The court is forced
to make some attempt to construe the transaction and the intentions and
expectations of the parties. Although the traditional rule of construction
approach is open to the criticism that the problem is often disposed of at a
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level of artificial analysis (that is, through adverse construction of the literal
wording of the contract document(s) so as to fulfil the real expectations of
the purchaser), the doctrine of "fundamental breach" is often applied with
little or no analysis whatsoever.
The ideal approach would be for a court to say "in our opinion, con-
sidering all the evidence, the seller promised a given good of a certain
quality and the buyer expected performance of that obligation in respect to
which the seller is in breach, with given remedies for non-performance".
The existing approach of both the traditional rule of construction and
the modem rule of fundamental breach is necessarily dependant upon the
court commencing its analysis from the starting point of a standard form
contract in respect to which the literal wording, because of included dis-
claimer clause(s), asserts that the real expectation of the purchaser in the
consumer sale is contrary to that expectation which the reasonable consumer
would truly have.
If the court had a statutory set of standards as to quality, etc. setting
forth the reasonable expectations in the usual consumer sale, with statutory
guidelines as to when a departure from the usual is permissible (e.g. the
"as is" transaction) and how a departure is to be accomplished, with the
court allowed discretion in considering all the evidence and simply asking the
above-mentioned basic question which underlies all of the principles and
considerations, greater simplicity, honesty, and consistency would be achieved.
As has been emphasized, the basic promises of the contract, in particular, the
price term and the description in respect to the goods sold, always suggest
that the person paying the price had certain minimum reasonable expecta-
tions which should be fulfilled.
It has, of course, always been a purpose of the court in giving the
remedy of damages on the basis of fulfilment of the expectation interest to
further contractual transactions generally in society by facilitating reliance
created by contracts.159 Through giving effect to substantive contractual
expectations, by whatever reasoning, the court is furthering what is con-
sidered to be the traditional policy reasons underlying the providing of
remedies by the common law of contract.
As with the traditional rule of strict construction, the Canadian courts
have employed, without hesitation, the British created doctrine of "funda-
mental breach". Thus, in Schmidt v. International Harvester Co. of Canada
Ltd.160 a favourable obiter was given, and in Knowles v. Anchorage Holdings
Co. Ltd.'10 "fundamental breach" was adopted as a basis for the court's
decision. By the time of the Suisse Atlantique 62 case in 1966, there were
'
5 oSee Fuller and Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (1936),
46 Yale Law Journal 373.
100 (1962), 38 W.W.R. 180 (Man. Q.B.).
101 (1964), 46 W.W.R. 173 (B.C. S.C.).
lO2 Supra, note 131.
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reported judgments of Canadian courts in British Columbia,163 Alberta,M4
Manitoba,61 and Nova Scotia,166 clearly adopting the doctrine of "funda-
mental breach". In none of the Canadian decisions is it clear whether the
doctrine of fundamental breach is clearly a rule of law or simply a rule of
construction. It seems that the courts, although not really conscious of this
question, have been employing the doctrine as simply a rule of construction.
A court can only construe a breach of contract where there has been a
promise, but once a court construes a breach a purported disclaimer should
(simply by reason of there being a breach of promise) be ineffective, at
least to the extent that the disclaimer clause suggests that the promissory
obligation in question has not arisen. It is a more difficult question if the
disclaimer clause seeks to limit the remedy normally available on breach,
because such a clause can be consistent with there being a primary promis-
sory obligation upon the seller with the secondary obligation created by the
law affording a remedy for breach being modified as intended by the
parties.16
7
With the limited liability clause there is less of an apparent contradic-
tion within the provisions of the contract as to what are the parties' true
intentions and expectations. However, when the limited liability clause over-
reaches to the point where in substance it is simply a disclaimer clause so
that, if enforced, it really renders the primary obligations of the seller illusory,
the clause should be similarly attacked and rendered ineffective.
The point is, with either the disclaimer clause or the limited liability
clause, a seller should not be able to avoid performing that which he is
reasonably expected to perform (and which the seller will, or should, realize
the purchaser expects to be performed). A promise has created expectations
and once construction has been made as to what those reasonable expecta-
tions are (considering all the evidence), the promise should be enforced for
those policy reasons traditionally asserted for enforcement of contractual
expectations. A determination of the reasonable expectations should be
made in every instance, and the result should always be that the construed
reasonable expectations are realized.
Anything literally purporting to contradict such reasonable expectations
should be irrelevant and ignored, at least to the degree of contradiction. The
crux of the issue in every litigious situation may therefore be stated as being
simply that the seller must deliver what the purchaser can reasonably assume
to have ordered (and what the seller should expect the purchaser to reason-
ably assume to have ordered).
This analysis of the underlying basis for the judicial approach in respect
to the doctrine of "fundamental breach" (i.e. that it is simply a modem rule
16 3 Supra, note 161.
164 Canadian-Dominion Leasing Corporation v. Suburban Superdrug Ltd. (1966),
55 W.W.R. 396, 56 D..,R. (2d) 43 (Alta. CA.).
105 Western Processing & Cold Storage Ltd. et al. v. Hamilton Construction Com-
pany Ltd. and Dow Chemical of Canada Ltd. (1965), 51 W.W.R. 354 (Man. CA.).
3
6 6 Pippy v. R.C.A. Victor Co. Ltd. (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 523 (N.S. Sup. C).
l6 7 Eg. Varga v. Stokes Seeds Ltd., [1962] O.R. 339 (Ont. H.C.).
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of construction) suggests that it should logically follow that the size of the
breach does not matter. In other words, even if it is a minor defect (for
example, a scratched fender rather than a complete "lemon" of an engine),
once the court construes the buyer's expectation to be that his new vehicle
would not have a scratched fender upon delivery then the court should afford
protection by providing the traditional remedies for the fulfilment of the
expectation.
Although the problem is perhaps relatively more difficult in trying to
determine whether the purchaser really assumed the risk of a scratched
fender, as opposed to the "lemon" of an engine (which is entirely inconsistent
with the price paid), in both instances it is a matter of construction of the
true transaction. However, once the label "fundamental" is used as the
doctrine by which the court deals with the matter, it becomes difficult to
give relief to the purchaser in respect to the new car which has simply a
scratched fender. The court tends to get into an irrelevant exercise as to
the point at which a breach is "fundamental". For example, one hundred
scratches over the body of the car might be considered to be "fundamental",
whereas simply two or three might not be "fundamental". This may result
in a denial of justice where there are simply minor defects but the true
expectation of the purchaser was that there would not be any such defects.
It may result also in a meaningless analysis by the court in determining the
dividing line for "fundamental breach". The end effect is confusion of case
precedents with resulting uncertainty for counsel in advising clients as to the
chances of success of a given action, difficulty in planning commercial trans-
actions and allocating risks with certainty, and ultimately, happenstance
justice.
With some breaches the risk of the ensuing loss may be really intended
by both parties to be with the purchaser. For example, it would be very
unusual for either party in a consumer sale to foresee a loss of pure expecta-
tion interest, that is, loss of profit through the failure of the promise. This is
not so in respect to the loss through the failure of the seller to deliver
goods ordered of a quality of that reasonably expected in respect to such a
product, given the price paid for goods of that description, considering all
the circumstances, in the market place. Would not the reasonable consumer
expect a remedy of the necessary repairs being done at the seller's expense
or alternatively, either suitable replacement or return of the purchase price by
the seller, perhaps subject to being off-set by the value of the limited use
received, if any from the good?
Although there may be a conceptual and verbal distinction between
"fundamental breach" and "breach of a fundamental term" there is no
meaningful difference"68 because both go to the question of deciding whether
the seller is not performing the substantive expectations of the purchaser.
The seller should not escape liability if he wilfully breaches a minor promise
(even if the risk is literally with the purchaser) because it cannot be said
that the true expectation of the parties was that the seller could breach in
168 Supra, note 159.
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such a fashion. Likewise, the seller should not escape liability if he inno-
cently breaches a major promise as it cannot be said that the true expectation
of the purchaser was that the seller could do so with impunity, even in the
presence of a literal disclaimer clause which purports to enable the seller
to do so.
Several criticisms then can be made in respect to the "fundamental
breach" approach. The approach may result in some inconsistency in
justice. The courts tend to approach the problem as a question of the
degree of breach, or alternatively, a question of the significance of the
promise breached, rather than simply construing the contract to see whether
there is a given promise, and a breach of that promise, and what was the
intention of the parties in respect to remedies. The courts may tend to
become bound by precedents in respect to the facts. By employing the label
"fundamental", rigidity may be introduced in that the court cannot give
redress in respect to minor breaches even though there is an obvious promise
and resulting reasonable expectation on the part of the consumer. To date
the courts have usually overcome this problem by just begging the question
and pasting the label "fundamental breach" in respect to the decision at
hand. Although this provides justice in the particular situation, it causes
uncertainty in both the planning of contracts and the predicting of the
decision which a court will render in the event of a breakdown of a contract.
The "fundamental breach" approach compounds the difficulties in the
calculation of risks for contracting parties, with resultant uncertainty for
both sellers and purchasers. For example, it is difficult to structure the
contract in such a way that the seller can be sure that he is not liable for a
"fundamental breach" when a purchaser is assuming voluntarily virtually all
of the risks (the "as is" transaction).
The implied conditions and warranties of the Sale of Goods Act
only amount to stating what the minimal reasonable expectations of any
purchaser would be in the normal course of events. Therefore, fundamental
breach should cover a breach of the statutory implied condition or warranty,
if "fundamental breach" is simply a rule of construction. However, there are
three problems in so doing. First, the label "fundamental" suggests that the
court can only give redress in respect to major breaches. Secondly, there
are countless precedents where the implid conditions and warranties have
been successfully disclaimed. Thirdly, the parol evidence rule, and the
disclaimer clause precluding oral representations, provide obstacles to giving
protection to an expectation arising from an oral representation.
There is some assertion that "fundamental breach" is simply a rule of
substantive law rather than simply a rule of construction. If this is true,
the court would be departing from traditional contract law and policy in
employing the doctrine, inasmuch as it might impose an obligation as a
matter of law notwithstanding that the intention of the parties as a matter
of construction could be truly said to have the disclaimer deal with the matter.
The decision in the Harbutt's169 case can perhaps be assailed on this basis.
269 Supra, note 147.
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The transaction in Harbutt's must be classified as a "commercial transaction"
rather than as a "consumer sale transaction". The parties had apparent
relatively equal bargaining power. If the intention was to provide for a
limited liability provision in the event of failure to perform, such intention
was subverted by the court's decision.
If the Harbutt's decision is on the basis that there cannot be a dis-
claimer for a fundamental breach as a rule of substantive law, then con-
tractual obligations can no longer be voluntary in nature. This flies in the
face of fundamental principles of contract law which remain suitable for the
commercial transaction. How can the draftsman of the commercial contract
today cope in planning to give effect to actual intention as to allocation of
risks?
If the "consumer sale" transaction is divorced from the "commercial
transaction", through a categorization of the consumer sale by statute and
a limitation imposed upon the operation of the disclaimer clauses in the
consumer sale, there is greater scope for the court to give effect to the actual
intentions of the parties in a commercial transaction through construing the
contract, and not unwittingly employing doctrine developed to cope with
situations of gross inequality of bargaining power and over-reaching standard
form contracts present in the consumer sale transaction. The courts have
become somewhat trapped by their own jargon, which is now employed for
all types of transactions, notwithstanding the underlying differences in the
two types of transaction.
4. The Judicial Treatment of Disclaimer Clauses on the Basis of Being
Contrary to a Rule of Substantive Common Law
The courts have not extended the historically developed equitable
principles which deny enforcement to the penalty clause on the basis of
unconscionability to disclaimer clauses, although arguably disclaimer clauses
are often different in form only from penalty clauses.
Consider four possible clauses which may be contained in a hypothetical
contract between A (purchaser) and B (seller) in respect to a sale of X tons
of goods in exchange for $10,000., delivery to be on a certain date.
(1) A obligates himself as a term of the contract to pay to B "on any
breach, the sum of $50,000. as liquidated damages, and not as a
penalty". A wrongfully refuses to take delivery.
(2) A makes a deposit of $9,000. A wrongfully refuses to take
delivery when same is tendered by B.
(3) The contract provides that B "shall not be liable to A for any
damages caused by delay in delivery, for any reason whatsoever".
B wrongfully refuses to deliver to A.
(4) The contract provides that B's liability for damages to A caused
by B's delay in delivery "for any reason whatsoever, is limited to
$1.00 per day". B wrongfully refuses to deliver to A.
Let us consider the extent to which each of the clauses are enforceable at
law.
[VOL. 10, NO. 2
Disclaimer Clauses
(1) The courts have always refused to enforce the clause which is not a
genuine pre-estimate of damages (as in the hypothetical) on the basis that
the clause is unconscionable when it calls for "a payment of money stipulated
as in terrorem of the offending party"' 0 to compel him to perform. This
refusal to enforce the penalty clause is consistent with the general position
of the common law in respect to remedies which is to provide the innocent
party with damages so to give him his expectation interest, that is, to put
him in the position as though his contract has been fulfilled but not to penalize
the party in breach simply for being in breach. Contract law does not provide
the innocent party with punitive damages.' 71
(2) Where a "deposit" has been given the courts historically did not provide
the party in breach the remendy of return of that portion of the deposit which
was in excess of the actual damages of the innocent party, the full deposit
being subject to forfeiture on the basis that a deposit is paid as "a guarantee
that the contract shall be performed". 172 The standard form contract, of
course, often provides as well expressly for forfeiture in respect to the
deposit.173
In recent years, however, courts have suggested the forfeiture of the
deposit will be disallowed where the sum of money forfeited is dispropor-
tionate to the damages suffered provided that it is unconscionable that the
money be retained. 174 It would be unjust enrichment to allow the innocent
party to have a windfall simply because the other party has breached the
contract. Therefore, the modern position in respect to deposits is con-
sistent with the historical approach in respect to penalty clauses. In both
instances the result is to afford the innocent party a remedy in money
170 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. New Garage and Motor Co., [1915] A.C.
79 at 86 (H.L.) e.g. Shatila v. Feinstein, [1923] 3 D.L.R. 1035 (Sask. CA.); cf.
U.C.C. 2-718(1). The "unconscionability" approach may perhaps be otherwise stated as
invalidating penalty clauses on the basis that same are contrary to public policy. How-
ever, the discussion in respect to penalty clauses does not usually take place on a public
policy basis. See Robophone Facilities Ltd. v. Blank, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1428, at 1446
(CA.), where Diplock, I. based the invalidation of penalty clauses on a public policy
basis.
171 Addis v. Gramophone, [1909] A.C. 488 (Eng. H.C.).
172 Howe v. Smith (1884), 27 Ch. D. 89, at 95; e.g. De Palma v. Runnymede
Iron & Steel Co., [1950] 1 D.L.R. 557 (Ont. CA.).
3
73 An example, taken from a Toronto car dealer's retail purchase order, reads:
"I agree to pay any balance which may be owing under this contract and to
accept delivery of the automobile herein referred to within forty-eight hours
after I have been notified that it is ready for delivery. Failure on my part to
pay the balance and take delivery of the automobile when notified as afore-
said forfeits my deposit to the Company as pre-estimated damages to cover
the Company's loss and expense and permits the Company to dispose of the
automobile without any liability to me whatsoever."
174 See the dicta of Somervell and Denning, LJJ. in Stockloser v. Johnson, [1954]
1 Q.B. 476 (CA.); but see Galbraith v. Mitchenall Estates Ltd., [1964] 2 All E.R. 653
(Q.B.); cf. the dicta of Ritchie, J. in Dimensional Investments Ltd. v. The Queen (1967),
64 D.L.R. (2d) 632 (S.C.C.), decided on other grounds; Popyk v. Western Savings and
Loan Association (1969), 67 W.W.R. 684; Hughes v. Lukewa (1970), 14 D.L.R. (3d)
110 (B.C. CA.); U.C.C. 2-718(2).
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damages only to the extent of his actual expectation interest, but not allow
unjust enrichment through allowing him to enforce payment, or retain monies,
above and beyond such expectation interest.
(3) and (4). The disclaimer clause is present in both the third and fourth
situations. The fourth situation involves what can be referred to as a
"limited liability" clause, and is provided as a separate example to illustrate
that the limited liability clause, although somewhat more moderate in effect
as compared with the total or near-total disclaimer clause, can have sub-
stantially the same effect as the innocent party is deprived of the normal
remedies he would otherwise have, including a claim for damages to the
extent of his expectation interest.
Thus, to the extent that the innocent party is deprived of his actual
expectation interest in the third and fourth situations the party in breach has
received a windfall and is unjustly enriched. There should perhaps be even
more sympathy in these situations for it is the innocent party who in effect
may be penalized, by not receiving his expectation interest.
Therefore, although the third and fourth situations involve clauses
different in form from the first and second situations they are not different in
substance because of the similar results through enforcement and accordingly
those principles of law providing relief in respect to the penalty clause and
forfeiture of deposit should similarly apply to the disclaimer clause in all its
variations. The courts have not, however, extended the unconscionability
approach to disclaimer clauses. 7 5.
This argument can be criticized on the basis that the disclaimer clause
is not always unconscionable. The question in the first instance in any
contractual breakdown should be, what is the expectation interest of each
party. Therefore, with the disclaimer clause (third and fourth situations) it
is conceivable that a court can say, considering all the evidence (including,
of course, the price paid) that the true expectation of the purchaser was
that he would not receive any relief because no obligation truly arose (third
situation) or only limited relief for the breach of the obligation (fourth
situation).
The penalty clause and the forfeiture of deposit are easier to handle in
that the court can be more certain 76 that monies are being paid, or for-
feited, beyond the true expectation interest. It is, of course, a possibility
with the disclaimer clause (particularly when it takes the form of simply a
limited liability clause) that it was truly intended to limit what would be
reasonable expectations in the usual transaction.
The point to realize is that there are limits to the effectiveness of the
rules of construction which constitute the present framework for the courts'
175 See Grand Trunk Ry of Canada v. Robinson, [1915] A.C. 740, at p. 747 (P.C.);
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd. v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd., [1933] A.C. 20 (H.L).
176 However, the most the court can be is simply "more certain" because the
parties may have bargained for the onerous clause because there was concern about




regulation of disclaimer clauses. The exercise of attempting to construe the
intention of the particular parties by the rules of construction is often artifi-
cial, as the courts are unable to say simply that to enforce the disclaimer
clause would be unconscionable or contrary to public policy for the reason
that enforcement would defeat the purchaser's reasonable expectations. The
unconscionability approach allows the court to consider more directly all
the relevant evidence, including the factor of the inequality of bargaining
power.
Many counsel would assert that Canadian courts have often acted upon
the impulse that the disclaimer clause is unconscionable and oppressive, and
have taken into account the factors of inequality of bargaining power, the
adhesion nature of the standard form contract, oppressiveness or surprise.
However, courts very seldom, expressly articulate the reasons for their deci-
sions in terms of the above grounds. Canadian courts only occasionally imply
that the court's refusal to consider a disclaimer clause as a term of the con-
tract is on the basis that to do so would be oppressive and unconscionable.
An example might be Keelan et al v. Norray Distributing Ltd. et al.177 where
the contract documents included a clause:
It is agreed between the parties that the terms and conditions set forth on the
reverse side hereof are part of this contract and are binding on the parties
hereto. 7 8
On the back there was a disclaimer clause which read:
There are no representations, collateral agreements, conditions or warranties,
express or implied, by statute or otherwise on the part of Vendor with respect
to the property or this contract or affecting the rights of the parties other than
as specifically contained herein.179
The purchasers were relying upon the seller's skill to sell them auto-
matic coin operated vacuum cleaners, which turned out to be faulty.
A finance company, the assignee of the benefits of the sale contract,
had caused the clause to be included. The court held:
There was no inquiry from the purchasers to ascertain it [what the clause said]
was true. Had it been brought to the purchaser's attention it would, of course,
have been repudiated. It was contrary to fact and opposed to common sense.
This was not a sale of standard commodities such as automobiles. [The finance
company] would understand very well indeed that purchasers of machines of this
sort must have had some assurance that they would be of suitable quality ...
nor could [the company's agent] close as he was to the transaction, have believed
that [the purchasers] ... were consciously undertaking, as provided in Para. 1 of
the Terms and Conditions, that their obligation to pay [the finance company]
was not subject to the condition that they were getting something useful for their
money.18 0
177 (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 466 (Man. Q.B.). The Canadian courts have occa-
sionally held whole contracts to be unconscionable. See Mundinger v. Mundinger
(1969), 3 D.LR. (3d) 338 (Ont. C.A.; Stevens v. Howitt (1969), 4 D.L.R. (3d) 50
(Ont. H.C.).
178 Id., at 471.
179 Id., at 472.
180 Id., at 475-76.
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The doctrine of public policy has been applied to limit the operation of
disclaimer clauses in the United States.' 8 ' If the doctrine of "fundamental
breach" was a rule of substantive common law before Suisse Atlantique,8 2
it could be classified as a rule of public policy.
CONCLUSIONS
The judicial treatment of disclaimer clauses in sale of goods trans-
actions has traditionally dealt with the disclaimer clause in all its variations
within the limitations of a private law framework. The rules of construction,
including the modem doctrine of fundamental breach, have been applied
within that context with commendable results for the most part but with a
great deal of artificiality in reasoning and consequential confusion. Happen-
stance justice occasionally results. There is uncertainty in the planning of
contractual obligations and the allocation of risks. Predictability is difficult
as to the outcome of litigation.
It is clear that the underlying impulse of the courts, whatever the
approach or jargon, is to provide a remedy of damages to fulfil a pur-
chaser's reasonable expectation interest through a contract; or to provide a
remedy of restitution. The courts are often prepared to consider all of the
relevant evidence, including oral representations, notwithstanding the parol
evidence rule or disclaimer clauses, so as to fulfil a reasonable expectation
interest or afford restitution.
The courts have carried over the doctrine of fundamental breach, really
developed to meet the consumer's reasonable expectations, to the commer-
cial transaction, such that questionable decisions are now being given.
The courts need a framework which allows them to deal with the
disclaimer clause in the consumer sale with flexibility, by hearing all the
relevant evidence, including evidence as to oral representations, and answer-
ing the basic issue in direct language: what was the consumer's reasonable
expectation through his contract? To accomplish that it is advantageous to
prohibit by statute disclaimer clauses in the consumer sale'8 3 and provide a
statutory set of standards, supplemented by regulations, so far as possible
for the consumer, seller, and court, thus providing a more concrete basis
than at present as to what reasonable expectations may be in the typical
consumer sale. Although there should still be room for the true "as is"
transaction, the statute could provide a channeling function to indicate when
this is permissible and to better suggest when such was truly intended.
l8 Eg. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc. 32 NJ. 358; 161A, 2d 69 (1959).
See also Corbin on Contracts (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1947) sec. 1472.
182 [1967] 1 A.C. 361 (H.L.); see discussion supra, at pp. 294-99.
183 S. 44 of The Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82 as am. by S.O. 1971,
s.2, makes such a prohibition in Ontario. The discussion of this and other legislative
provisions in reaction to disclaimer clauses will be covered in a subsequent article.
For other Canadian legislative enactments, see supra, note 1.
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Remedies can also be strengthened by a statutory base, with the nature of
the remedies determined upon functional criteria considering the practicalities
of the various situations when there is a breach of contract.
The courts would also be aided by an unconscionability provision to
provide a general framework with which to deal with the unusual, but
unconscionably oppressive, clause or contract. Such provision would also
apply to the commercial transaction, which, unlike the consumer sale, would
best continue to be governed primarily by the traditional rules of construction
and law.
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APPENDIX D
CANADIAN CASES ON DISCLAIMER CLAUSES SHOWING






[assey Co. v. Thibert 1907 fitness for purpose no
st Thresher Co. v. Andrews 1908 f.f.p. no
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no breach
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no
no
no
no
no
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